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COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 
I note the ALRC's preference for submissions to be written against the questions raised 
in their issues paper. However I find that this format would not allow me to address 
important issues around customers of digital material. Unless and until these customer 
concerns are addressed through a proper regime of consumer protection, there will be 
unnecessary constraints on growth of the digital economy.  
This submission briefly reviews the dearth of empirical evidence that copyright policy 
is either effective or efficient. It then focuses on consumer rights, how these are 
unnecessarily undermined by copyright policy, and how this lack of balance between 
producer and consumer rights is radically worsened in a digital environment with 
legislated monopoly privileges. A poor consumer environment will impede the 
development of a flourishing digital sector. A range of specific issues are discussed 
briefly: double-dipping through technological protection measures (TPMs), the right for 
communities to access cultural material sold using copyright privileges, the excessive 
strength of copyright privileges, compliance costs and the proportionality of penalties. 
Background 
Copyright commenced as a pragmatic exchange of outsourced censorship services in 
exchange for a royal monopoly privilege. Since then it has grown radically as business 
interests seek and gain extended monopolies to ensure their profitability. But it remains, 
as Lord Templeton said just before his elevation to the House of Lords, a restraint on 
trade. He went on to say that such a restriction could only be justified to the extent it 
was necessary for public benefit.1 
Objectives and guiding principles 
The ALRC rightly notes in the issues paper that the objectives of copyright have been 
subject to some debate. The character of copyright policy is less controversial. It is a 
government intervention in (regulation of) a market, whereby the government grants 
applicants quite strong monopoly privileges. What is it that the government 
(community) gets in exchange for these monopoly restrictions on competition? This 
should be a greater quantum of creative output. 
If a greater creative output is the goal, is copyright an efficient and effective means of 
achieving this?  
Economic impacts 
First one must address the issue of the extension of copyright privileges to forms of 
output which contain no creativity. Why should such business activities be sheltered 
from competition? I realise this issue is outside the terms of reference for this enquiry, 
but I raise it here as it is an important, but as yet unaddressed, concern in copyright 
policy. This concern has some relevance to data mining issues. 
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Setting aside the extension of copyright to non-creative products,2 what is the evidence 
that copyright policy leads to greater creative output in Australia? With respect to the 
US market, from which so much of the change to Australia's copyright policy derives, 
Hunt and Schuchman, considering books and periodicals, find that there is limited 
evidence that some creative works are induced by the copyright privilege. Many are not 
affected by copyright and would be produced absent copyright privileges.3 Hunt and 
Schuchman go on to consider the important economic question as to whether the 
activity induced by copyrights has greater value that the activity displaced by this 
market intervention. Any such benefits are very dependent on the assumption that the 
private returns from publishing books are less than the returns to the community. This 
assumption seems to rest on a view that books have greater merit than other goods and 
services, but this is a very primitive value judgement. Any such benefits would in any 
event need to be offset by the administrative and static efficiency losses of the market 
intervention. This analysis can be extended to other forms of 'creative" output covered 
by copyright privileges.4  
Overall it is clear that there is very limited evidence that copyright policy is effective – 
many copyrighted works would be created and published absent the copyright privilege. 
There are also issues as to whether copyright policy is efficient – as privileges are 
granted whether or not the work is induced, there are substantial costs which are not 
offset by accompanying benefits. The evidence that there are spillover benefits from all 
forms of copyrighted work is absent.  
Clearly there is a need for greater economic discipline in respect to economic policy. 
Many recent changes are the result of lobbying by sectional interests – many from 
overseas – and in some cases (such as the copyright term extension agreed in the 
AUSFTA "free" trade package) these changes clearly involve a net loss to Australia. 
Those who paid for this negotiated loss have never been compensated. It is moot 
whether the small export gains in the meat and livestock industry sufficiently offset 
these losses at the national level.5 
Australia has a deficit on the copyright trade account. Every change which extends the 
privileges granted to holders of copyright means a loss to Australia as most of these 
monopoly benefits flow directly overseas.  
The continuing lack of proper economic evaluation of 
copyright policy is disturbing. For example, in relation to 
the critical issue of the relative benefit flowing to authors 
of creative works compared to retailers of creative works, 
there is continuing ignorance. While the general view 
appears to be that, except for established creators, the 
major benefits flow to the retailers, greater empirical 
evidence on this issue is essential for good policy-
making. In the academic field, the regular very high profit 
margins achieved by academic publishers point to excess 
profits and therefore failure in the market.6 The regular 
excess profits point to excessive copyright privileges as 
the source of this market failure. The consequence is a 
higher than necessary cost burden on educational 
institutions and thus on students and their parents.  
There is a dearth 
of evidence that 
copyright policy is 
either effective in 
inducing 
additional work 
or efficient in 
delivering this a 
minimum cost. 
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Consumer rights 
Against this background how are the rights of consumers balanced against those of 
copyright holders. 
The simple answer is that mostly they are not. 
When a consumer purchases a good or service, s/he generally acquires full property 
rights, including the right to quiet enjoyment of their property. Use of some categories 
of goods or services is subject to general laws designed to minimise negative impacts on 
other parties. For example on-road use of a car is subject to general road rules. But in 
such examples it is clear that there is a general community benefit from these limited 
restrictions on how the property is used. 
However in the case of any product covered by copyright laws, monopoly-holders have 
managed to persuade governments to intervene and remove the consumer's property 
rights. These interventions are designed to maximise retailers' profits. They serve no 
community purpose – indeed they impede the community goal of the dissemination of 
cultural products. As Boldrin and Levine have pointed out: 
"from the point of view of economics, there are two ingredients in the law: the 
right to buy and sell copies of ideas, and the right to control how other people 
make use of their copies. The first right is not controversial. In copyright law, 
when applied to the creator this right is sometimes called the “right of first sale.” 
However, it extends also to the legitimate rights of others to sell their copies. It is 
the second right, enabling the owner to control the use of intellectual property 
after sale, that is controversial. This right produces a monopoly – enforced by the 
obligation of the government to act against individuals or organizations that use 
the idea in ways prohibited by the copyright or patent holder."7  
In the pre-digital age this intrusion of monopolists into the ownership right of their 
customers was limited by both technology and doctrines of fair use. It was 
technologically impractical to prevent customers from lending their books to friends, 
bringing their records to parties, and so on. Because it was uneconomic for sellers to 
radically enforce the privileges gained under copyright policy, there was little consumer 
revolt against the inequitable provisions of copyright law.   
In the digital age there is a very much greater intrusion of retailers into the property 
rights of their customers. This has led to massive consumer resistance to the 
unreasonable limitations on the use of their property which governments actively 
sanction through copyright laws that have not been subject to proper economic analysis. 
The Digital environment 
In the digital world there are a wide range of technological measures used to control 
access to and use of the copy of the work that has been sold. In total these technological 
features have converted the sale to a rental – but the consumer is not clearly advised of 
this. Consumers of digital material – whether this be e-books, music or film – consider 
they have bought a product. After all, when they complete the transaction on the net, the 
button says "BUY". But the sellers take a different view and use fine print – the key 
terms of which are never specified during the sale transaction – to define the purchase 
as a rental. 
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Consider the example of Kindle books. While the act of creating a work achieves a 
global copyright privilege, sellers do not face a requirement to sell a global use right. 
Kindle does not advertise on its web-site that use of purchased e-books is restricted to 
the country of purchase. Should the owner of a Kindle move to another country, 
Amazon will "lock" all the books the owner has purchased. This is theft. 
But it is sanctioned by unbalanced copyright laws that do not require those who gain a 
global privilege to sell rights allowing global use. In a non-digital world sellers cannot 
prevent the sold copies being transferred to another country or bequeathed to one's 
heirs. But in the digital world, sellers take both these actions.8 
The sale of these copies is covered by the word BUY, not the word RENT. The 
underlying business model is iniquitous and creates substantial discontent among 
consumers. This unfair dealing is facilitated by law because: 
• there is inadequate protection for consumers of digital products in either consumer 
protection law or copyright law 
• contracts are allowed to over-ride consumer protections provided in copyright law 
• domestic remedies to this theft are not readily available. 
Digital operators working with such models are fair set to spoil 
the emerging digital market. If the government wants to 
encourage strong growth in Australia's digital economy it needs 
to put in place a sensible and accessible regime for consumer 
protection. This must include the right to keep, retain and use 
purchased copies in any way except for commercial uses. Unless 
the sale is clearly stated as a rental sale,9 the seller should have 
no right to take back the product. If such events occur, 
consumers need streamlined fast processes to sue for recompense 
or restoration in domestic small claims courts. 
Under general consumer law, sales contracts are not allowed to 
remove consumer protection rights granted by legislation. Government action to protect 
consumers from the rapacious behaviour of many sellers of digital goods is long 
overdue.  
Double-dipping 
On has to ask why sellers of digital goods have any need for a legislated intervention in 
the market to ensure they have a period of market exclusivity during which they can 
recoup their investment costs. Digital goods sellers have a range of technical measures 
which achieve this end. Providing them with copyright monopolies in addition to the 
legal interventions with respect to encryption measures is double-dipping. 
Any goods which are encrypted or have attached 
digital rights management measures should be 
ineligible for copyright privileges. A first-best 
solution would be to require the producer or 
seller of digital goods to choose between forms 
of limiting competition – either technological 
protection measures or copyright. But not both. 
The government 
needs to put in 




protection in the 
digital economy. 
Goods using TPMs 
should be ineligible 
for copyright 
privileges. 
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Other consumer and community issues 
There are a range of other issues that need to be considered if one is to move towards a 
balanced copyright policy which has general acceptance by consumers and citizens as 
well as buy those who seek these monopoly interventions. The most important of these 
are the right of community access to cultural material that has been publicly sold with 
copyright privileges; the strength of copyright privileges; the right not to have excessive 
compliance costs imposed as part of the copyright regime; and the issue of the 
proportionality of penalties for breach of this economic policy. 
Community access to cultural material 
With the advent of moral rights for authors, the issue of whether an author has the right 
to remove material from public access becomes germane. Given that the copyright 
privilege is offered for the purpose of generating a higher level of creative output, this 
raises the issue of whether creators of such output have the right to prevent access 
except through a price mechanism. Clearly, if there are substantial errors in a work, an 
author will need to rectify these. But in other circumstances, if a creator has sold works 
under copyright provisions, these need to continue to be available to the community. 
This is an essential part of the quid pro quo of the grant of monopoly privileges.  
This community right of access needs to be the driving force informing the design of 
access to works which are no longer readily available (so-called orphan works). A first-
best solution to this problem would be to address the excessive strength of the current 
privileges granted to copyright holders. 
It also needs to inform policy as to the interaction of copyright monopolies and the role 
of museums and art galleries in preserving cultural materials and providing community 
access to this. At present copyright policy actively undermines the role of these 
institutions in undertaking this important cultural role.10  
Material that has never been publicly provided or marketed should not be eligible for a 
copyright privilege. Material that is not creative (for example sub-division plans or 
photographs made for the factual purpose of recording artefacts) should not be eligible 
for copyright privileges. In neither case is there any evidence that the copyright 
incentive produces additional creative output for the benefit of the public.  
A long-standing provision in trade mark law is that when a trademark enters normal use 
as a word – for example escalator, vacuum – then it ceases to be allowable as a trade 
mark. There needs to be a parallel in copyright law. When particular parts of 
copyrighted works become common usage – so common that there is almost no 
realisation that they are part of a specific work – then they should cease to have the 
same degree of monopoly privilege. This should be part of an expanded role for fair use 
exceptions to monopoly pricing. These exceptions are part of the quid pro quo to 
compensate consumers broadly for the loss they suffer through the extensive grant of 
these monopolies.  
The strength of copyright privileges 
The extraordinarily long length of the copyright privilege is an active impediment to 
access to orphan works. In considering the book market, Plant long ago argued for a 
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maximum copyright term of 5 years.11 It is well known that the very long monopolies 
now provided benefit only the major corporate players who have lobbied for them.12  
Actions such as these – where democratically elected governments act in the interests of 
a few corporate players and against the interests of the public – are a major factor in 
explaining citizen disengagement and the increased lack of trust in politicians. 
Politicians can re-build this trust if they start acting in the public interest rather than in 
the interests of a small part of the business community. Where the beneficiaries are 
largely foreign corporations – as in the case of Australia's copyright policy – this over-
riding of the public interest is particularly hard to take.  
There is no evidence that the Australian public would have less access to cultural 
material with a much shorter copyright term. Producers of most copyrighted works gain 
most of their economic return in the early years. It is time Australia started negotiating 
for a reduction in the term of copyright monopolies to five years. 
Compliance costs 
In determining the nature of the granted copyright privilege there has been no 
consideration given to administrative costs imposed on other parties. This is particularly 
evident in the unthinking extension of the ban on making electronic copies for use in an 
electronic environment. For example, there is no reasonable argument why libraries 
have to remove electronic documents from cache after each download. All the 
prohibitions which operate to increase costs for third parties in the digital environment 
need active re-consideration. Such provisions do nothing to increase the returns to the 
copyright holder – they simply make lift more difficult for third parties. They actively 
impede the growth of new industries such as cloud computing.  
Proportionality in penalties 
A final extremely important issue is the proportionality of penalties for copyright 
infringement. Copyright is a policy designed to achieve economic and cultural goals. 
Penalties should therefore be civil penalties. The introduction of criminal penalties as a 
response to copyright infringement seeks to be an accident of history,13 then spread 
globally through negotiations which did not adequately consider public and consumer 
issues.  
This is fundamentally bad policy and a very disproportionate response to contravention 
of a policy designed simply to increase creators' profits. The appropriate penalty for 
unauthorised use of material protected by these legislated monopolies is financial – 
reimbursement of the loss to the creator, with perhaps a fine for the contravention if it is 
serious enough. Should an offender disobey a court order then other penalties could be 
considered. But a simple offence against of government's market regulation system does 
not merit criminal penalties. Above all it does not merit extradition to face charges of 
such economic offences in overseas jurisdictions.14 These extradition incidents have all 
been with respect to digital content and often involve individual citizens rather than 
large-scale commercial use.  
As a matter of urgency Australia should review its extradition treaties to ensure 
residents and citizens cannot be extradited for offences against overseas copyright laws. 
Australia should also commence lobbying for the removal of criminal sanctions from 
international copyright treaties.  
ALRC DIGITAL COPYRIGHT SUBMISSION Page 7 
 
 
Innovat ion  Perspect ives  
The recipients of the government's copyright monopolies have also been lobbying for 
penalties that remove rights of internet access when they accuse a person of 
transgressing copyright privileges. Again this is a disproportionate response. The issues 
are well discussed by Bonadio so are not repeated here.15 The issues include whether 
internet access is now a fundamental human right.  
Australia should take a stand of principle that internet access is a fundamental human 
right and should actively oppose inclusion of any such provisions in any so-called trade 
or other international negotiations.  
Recommendations 
To the extent possible within the terms of national sovereignty, I recommend that the 
government take action to achieve the outcomes listed below. Where the government 
has given away national sovereignty, then it should immediately take action to negotiate 
to achieve these outcomes in international instruments.  
• provide legislated consumer protection for buyers of digital material; 
• make it unlawful for contracts to override legislated and common law consumer 
rights with regard to copyright or digital material; 
• provide for cheap and simple domestic remedies where sellers of digital material 
steal from their customers (perhaps via a collecting society?); 
• provide that proprietors using technological protection measures shall not also be 
eligible for copyright monopolies; 
• require that if a global copyright is taken then buyers must always be provided with 
global rights of use; 
• actively review copyright policy to ensure it does not impede museums and art 
galleries in their roles of protecting and disseminating cultural artefacts; 
• actively review copyright provisions which simply add costs to third parties without 
providing a financial incentive to creators; 
• remove copyright from materials that do not involve creativity;  
• actively lobby to reduce the term of copyright monopolies to 5 years; 
• actively lobby to remove criminal penalties from this economic policy intervention; 
• take a stand of principle that internet access is a human right and cannot be 
removed as a punishment; and 
• immediately review extradition treaties to ensure that Australian residents and 
citizens cannot be extradited for offences against legislated monopoly statutes. 
Conclusion 
In concluding I would just like to make a small comment on the language used in the 
issues paper. Copyright, like patents and trademarks, is an area where government 
intervention can create very significant profits for selected parties. As a consequence 
there is extensive lobbying in these areas. A standard technique is selling a particular 
viewpoint is the use of language to "frame" a perspective, loading this with particular 
values. This technique is rife through these monopoly spaces. The beneficiaries of these 
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government granted monopolies regularly refers to themselves as "rights-holders". But 
there is no right to a monopoly privilege. They also refer to those making unauthorised 
use of copyright as "pirates". Yet the evidence, particularly in the digital world, is that it 
is the copyright holders that indulge in theft.  
In formal government deliberations of policy in this area it would be preferable not to 
use of the type of loaded language developed by rent-seekers. It indicates a prejudice 
which I am sure the ALRC would wish to avoid. The recipient of a copyright monopoly 
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